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ABSTRACT: Since 2008, the Taiwanese business group Want Want, having made a fortune 
in China, has returned to Taiwan to buy a major media group and attempt to exert political 
influence on Taiwanese society. This paper analyses the rise and rationale of this new type of 
media investor in the light of the business/government relationship under China’s model of 
state capitalism. According to the analysis developed in this paper, when China needed 
foreign investment in the early 1990s, Taiwanese investors were warmly welcomed by the 
Chinese government, which provided Taiwanese businesses with tax incentives at that time. 
After 2000, however, when not only domestic Chinese entrepreneurs emerged but also more 
non-Chinese investors entered the Chinese markets, Taiwanese businesses realised that the 
investment environment had become much more competitive, so they had to work hard on 
building ties with Chinese officials. Under these circumstances, Want Want bought into 
media in Taiwan as an asset to be used in order to build social ties with the Chinese 
government, but in doing so, Want Want has also triggered resistance from Taiwanese civil 
society. Future researchers and regulators can continue to watch and define this new type of 
investment, which has become increasingly significant in this region. 
KEYWORDS: Taiwanese business, Taiwan, media merger, media monopoly, cross-Strait 
relations, government-business relations. 
 
Introduction 
 
From 1987 to the present, Taiwanese investment in China has undergone dramatic changes. 
As emphasised in this special issue, actor, change, and value are three core elements we 
constantly reflect upon in order to analyse the procedural changes in Taiwan. In this paper, 
we aim to reveal the long-term evolution of cross-Strait economic activities. Actors who 
participated in this long-term process (from the end of the 1980s until now) include 
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Taiwanese business people (Taishangs1), and the governments in both Taipei and Beijing. We 
argue that Taishangs’ values have changed during this long-term process. When the Chinese 
government needed foreign investment in the early 1990s, Taiwanese investors were warmly 
welcomed by the Chinese government and were thus content to pursue mainly economic 
interests. However, after 2000, with the emergence of domestic Chinese entrepreneurs and 
non-Chinese investors in the Chinese markets, Taishangs had to build closer political ties 
with Chinese officials in order to protect their economic interests in China. Some Taishangs 
even adopted the strategy of buying media in Taiwan as social assets to strengthen political 
ties with Chinese officials. For example, a Taiwanese technology tycoon, Cher Wang, the 
owner of HTC Corporation, which has substantial investments in China, has gradually taken 
ownership of Taiwan’s leading cable channel group, TVBS, since 2011. Likewise, a 
Taiwanese processed foods conglomerate, Ting Hsin Food Group, which developed its 
business in China in 1990, also attempted to acquire a major cable TV operator in Taiwan in 
2014.2 The Want Want group is a critical case to illustrate the strategy adopted. This group 
purchased a cross-media group in Taiwan,3 which allowed it to serve as a messenger to 
deliver the pro-Chinese government’s political ideology in Taiwan. It was therefore able to 
use Taiwanese media as an asset to build ties with Chinese officials at the cost of local 
resistance from Taiwan. We acknowledge that the Want Want group might be an extreme case 
in indicating the changing values of Taishangs; however, we take it as an example of how the 
dynamic of political economy across the Strait has caused business interests to become 
intertwined with the government’s political goals.  
The Want Want group, which was originally established in Taiwan and moved its 
business to China in 1992, later returned to Taiwan to buy Taiwan’s main media group. Want 
Want further attempted to buy a major multiple system operator (MSO, referring to an 
operator that owns several cable systems) in a market where more than 80% of homes watch 
cable television. This merger later resulted in the island’s biggest demonstration against 
                                                        
1 Taishangs are known as Taiwanese business people; in this paper we use Taishangs to replace Taiwanese 
business people. 
2 In 2011, Cher Wang bought a 26% stake in TVB, Hong Kong's leading free-to-air broadcaster. As TVB was 
the parent company of TVBS, a major cable channel family in Taiwan, Wang also became part-owner of TVBS. 
In 2016, Wang bought the remaining shares of TVBS at the cost of NT$130 billion. Hsu Yi-Ping, “Cher Wang 
buys TVBS for 130 billion dollars,” Liberty Times, 20 October 2016, 
http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/focus/paper/1046492 (accessed on 2 January 2017). 
3 The China Times group include two newspaper titles, one terrestrial television station and a cable channel 
family. 
 3 
media monopoly on 1 September 2012. 
Want Want’s investment in Taiwan’s media had a different rationale from that of previous 
Taiwanese business groups. According to related literature, previous Taishangs in China 
mainly followed the economic rationale. They wanted to maximise profits and reduce costs, 
so they moved to China and seldom returned to invest in Taiwan. They focused on their own 
business and did not invest in media-related concerns. They maintained good relations with 
all parties and did not offend local communities.4 However, while Want Want’s headquarters, 
factories, and revenues remained in China,5 the company came back to Taiwan and invested 
in the media business. It should be noted that investing in the media is a costly and risky 
endeavour; Want Want paid NT$20.4 billion (around US$680 million) to buy the China Times 
media group, and it took another NT$80 billion (around US$2.6 billion) to buy the main 
cable operator. While Taiwan has respected press freedom since the lifting of martial law in 
1987, Want Want used this media freedom to deliver the pro-Chinese government’s political 
ideology.6 Its chairman, Tsai Eng-Meng (蔡衍明), used the media to attack those he deemed 
enemies, including legislative regulators, journalists, and citizen groups.7 
Concerning this type of media investor, there are at least two existing explanations, each 
with specific policy implications. The first explanation is that Taiwanese capital has 
recovered media ownership from foreigners. The Taiwanese government has loosened its 
regulation over media ownership, and foreign investors have been allowed to own up to 60% 
of cable systems since 2002. Since then, Taiwanese cable systems have mainly been owned 
by foreign companies. The owner of the Want Want group often describes himself as a 
Taiwanese coming back to boost Taiwan’s economy and to improve cross-Strait relations.8 
From this perspective, Taiwanese regulators should welcome the company’s return for its 
ability to reclaim Taiwan’s cable TV industry from foreign investors (the private companies 
that have bought and sold Taiwan’s cable companies), and treat them as Taiwanese nationals. 
                                                        
4 Chun-Yi Lee, “Between Dependency and Autonomy – Taiwanese Entrepreneurs and Local Chinese 
Governments,” Journal of Current Chinese Affairs (China aktuell), Vol. 39, No. 1, 2010, pp. 37-71. 
5 Want Want China Holdings Limited, “Annual Report, 2015,” 2015, 
http://www.want-want.net/upload/Investor/C16020406.pdf (accessed on 10 May 2016). 
6 Chin-Hwa Chang, “Analysis of the News Placement and Coverage of Three Chinese Buying Groups by 
Taiwan’s Four Main Newspapers from the Perspective of Van Dijk’s Discourse and Manipulation Theory,” 
Chinese Journal of Communication Research, No. 20, 2011, pp. 65-93. 
7 “Tsai Eng Meng: My Reasons for Buying Media,” Hwa Xia Net, 13 December 2013, 
http://big5.huaxia.com/tslj/rdrw/2013/12/3660484_3.html (accessed on 10 May 2016). 
8 Ibid.  
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The second explanation completely rejects the first, arguing that this type of capital can 
be described as “Red capital.” It is argued that Want Want, although established in Taiwan, 
has become deeply rooted in China and transmits a pro-Chinese government political 
ideology. Some opposition politicians have pointed out that 93% of Want Want’s revenue was 
generated from the Chinese market and that the Want Want group is traded on the Hong Kong 
stock market; therefore the Want Want group should be considered a Chinese industry.9 
According to this interpretation, Taiwanese regulators should consider Mr. Tsai a Chinese 
capitalist and should not allow him to buy Taiwan’s cable systems, because Chinese business 
people are not allowed to enter this market according to Taiwanese law. 
However, both interpretations fail to explain how this type of media investment emerged, 
nor can they fully explain why Want Want voluntarily provided ideological services to the 
Chinese government. The debatable point of these two explanations also lies in the definition 
of the capital owner’s nationality. In line with the three main elements of our special issue, 
this article asks: what kind of Taiwanese businessmen does Want Want represent? How did it 
emerge? What are the main rationales for its practices? There is no doubt that Taishangs – in 
our example, the Want Want group – are the agents of this change. By tracing the process of 
the Want Want group’s emergence in Taiwan and its subsequent investment in China, we aim 
to identify the changing nature of business’s interaction with government; more specifically, 
in our case, of Taishangs with the Chinese government. 
This paper argues that before 2008, Want Want mainly followed an economic logic and 
expanded in many provinces. However, under Chinese state capitalism, Want Want needed to 
build ties with the Chinese central government. When the CCP conducted its “Grand 
Overseas Propaganda” Campaign in 2008, co-opting Chinese private capitalists to acquire 
media abroad, Want Want acquired Taiwanese media and imposed a firm “pro-China” stance 
on the media outlets purchased by the group; however, in doing so it encountered severe local 
resistance in Taiwan, where 60% of the population considered themselves Taiwanese (not 
Chinese), and another 85% wanted either de-jure independence or de-facto independence 
from China.10 The empirical data for this paper come from long-term interviews with 
                                                        
9 Hsin-Yi Huang, “Pan-Green Legislators Point out the Invasion of Chinese Capital in China Times,” Apple 
Daily, 21 May 2010, http://www.appledaily.com.tw/appledaily/article/forum/20100521/32528299 (accessed on 
10 May 2016). 
10 Chen-Fang Yu, “Public opinion on independence and unification in Taiwan: Is Taiwan independence the 
consensus? Who Governs Taiwan Forum, 12 June 2014, http://whogovernstw.org/2014/06/12/fangyuchen2/ 
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Taishangs in China, including three field trips in 2004-2005, 2008-2009, and 2014-2016 
respectively. In the first two field trips, the interviewees were Taishangs in China, most of 
them members of Taiwanese Businessmen Association (TBA) in various cities, investing in a 
range industries such as manufacturing, biotechnology, furniture, footwear, toys, etc. The 
latest fieldwork (2014-2016) concentrated on ICT manufacturers in China – for instance, 
manufacturers of panel, of parts and components for computers or mobile phones, and of 
semi-conductors – and also a small percentage of software designers. The locations of the 
interviews were Tianjin, Beijing, Shanghai, Kunshan, Dongguan, and Taipei. The reason for 
combining three periods of interviews in this paper is to compare Taishangs’ values in 
different periods, along with their efforts in building or maintaining relationships with local 
Chinese officials, in order to answer the core question: why and how Taishangs changed their 
strategies to secure their economic interest in China. Three periods of interview data provide 
a grand background to Want Want’s emergence, and to be more specific, we also combine 
observations from the media about Want Want. The most recent field trip was funded with the 
generous support of the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation for International Scholarly Exchange 
as well as the Ministry of Science and Technology, Taiwan. The structure of this paper is as 
follows: the next section introduces a brief theoretical framework, which mainly focuses on 
three different approaches to business and government relationships and also more 
importantly, a particular focus on why media are a valuable investment for capitalists. The 
second section documents the history of Want Want’s investment in China within the bigger 
picture of Taiwanese investment in China. This is followed by discussion and analysis, and 
the final section serves as a conclusion.  
 
The government/business relationship and the special characteristics of media 
investment 
 
Before we start to discuss the government/business relationship, it is important to note that in 
the case of Want Want, there are two governments involved: the Chinese (or Beijing) 
government and the Taiwanese (or Taipei) government.11 We acknowledge that in terms of 
                                                                                                                                                                            
(accessed on 6 March 2017). 
11 In this paper, the terms “mainland”/“China” and “Taiwan” are used for the two entities on the two sides of the 
Taiwan Strait, for want of any other terms that would be found acceptable by all the actors involved. “China” 
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the Chinese government, there is empirical evidence that local governments’ interests conflict 
with the central government’s.12 Nevertheless, in this paper we treat the interests and goals of 
China’s central and local governments as one. In the following theoretical discussion of the 
government/business relationship, although we mainly focus on Want Want’s interaction with 
the Chinese government, we also pay attention to Taishangs’ relationships with Taiwanese 
law makers, for the reason that Taishangs’ relationship with or influence on the Taiwanese 
government is seen as being of strategic value to the Chinese government. This point will be 
explained in detail through the different periods of interaction between the Chinese 
government and Taishangs.  
Coming back to the theoretical discussion of the government/business relationship, three 
main approaches are discussed here, namely the society-oriented approach, system-oriented 
approach, and state-centred approach.13 We argue that the business/government relationship 
in Taiwan, during the period from the 1990s to the present, has been a society-oriented 
approach, and that the dynamic of Taiwan further strengthened the business/government 
relationship in China under the state-centred approach. The connection between the 
system-oriented approach and Want Want’s case is exactly the controversy over defining the 
capital owner’s nationality in a globalised world.  
 
Society-oriented approach 
The society-oriented approach emphasises business as a powerful interest group that can 
constrain government bureaucrats. 14  In order to pursue their own interests, capitalists 
endeavour to guide the direction of government policy through all possible channels. The 
core conception of the society-oriented approach lies in the “structural dependence” of the 
state on capital. There are two main reasons why society-oriented scholars assert the 
significant influence of capital owners, especially in organised interest groups putting 
                                                                                                                                                                            
refers to the People’s Republic of China (PRC or “the Beijing government”). “Taiwan” refers to the Republic of 
China (ROC or “the Taipei government”). 
12 Zheng Yongnian, De Facto Federalism in China: Reforms and Dynamics of Central–Local Relations, 
Singapore, World Scientific, 2007.  
13 G. John Ikenberry, David Lake, and Michael Mastanduno, The State and American Foreign Economic Policy, 
Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1988. 
14 Charles E. Lindblom, Politics and Markets: The World’s Political Economic Systems, New York, Basic Book 
Inc., 1977; Adam Przeworski and Michel Wallerstein, “Structure Dependence of the State on Capital,” The 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 82, No. 1, 1988, pp. 11–29. 
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pressure on the government. First of all, in a market-oriented society, the capital holder’s 
investment provides a living for the majority of people. They can provide employment 
opportunities and subsidise government expenditure on public infrastructure. As a result, as 
Lindblom argues, governments must induce businesses rather than command them.15 There 
is little space for a government to refuse to offer benefits to businesses because governments 
need their financial support.  
The second point relates to elections. In a democratic society, political parties need to be 
responsive to the electorate. Politicians who expect to be elected or re-elected need to 
consider the effects of their policies on business for the simple reason that these decisions 
will cause a domino effect. If the capital owners are dissatisfied with investment policies, 
they will withdraw their capital or initiate an investment strike, causing unemployment and 
financial instability in society. The society-oriented approach also emphasises capital owners 
as important economic and political actors because politicians rely on private businesses for 
political support, for instance donations and votes. Governments have the pressure of facing a 
trade-off with capital owners to secure their political continuance.16 Following the logic of 
this argument, it can be suggested that businesses or markets constrain the policy-making 
process.17 
It can be argued that elections in China don’t have any meaningful impact, as the 
Chinese Communist Party still holds on to power under the principle of so-called “democratic 
centralism.”18 As a result, it is possible to argue that business influence on the Chinese 
government should be less significant than in democratic countries, as the political party (the 
CCP) doesn’t need to be responsive to the electorate. However, the society-oriented approach 
fits into Taiwanese society, and Taiwanese business’s influence on Taiwan’s legislative Yuan 
election is especially apparent in the period from 1994 onwards. The interaction between 
Taiwanese business and the Taiwanese government has transformed Taishangs into a strategic 
asset for the Chinese government in the expectation of political reunification.  
System-oriented approach 
The system-oriented approach focuses on the growing strength of the market to constrain a 
                                                        
15 Charles E. Lindblom, Politics and Markets, op. cit., p. 173. 
16 Adam Przeworski and Michel Wallerstein, “Structure Dependence of the State on Capital,” op. cit., p. 13.  
17 Charles E. Lindblom, “The Market as Prison,” The Journal of Politics, Vol. 44, No. 2, 1982, p. 327. 
18 Michael Waller, Democratic Centralism: A Historical Commentary, Manchester, Manchester University 
Press, 1981, pp. 91–102.  
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government’s power.19 Scholars of the system-oriented approach argue that in the global era, 
national governments compete for foreign investment. 20  The increasing speed of 
globalisation accelerates the pace of capital flight. The growth of technology is the main 
factor enhancing business power under globalisation.21 Capital holders have more resources 
by which to manoeuvre or to choose their preferred investment environment. The advance of 
modern technology is one of the key arguments of the system-oriented approach; the removal 
of capital controls and the lifting of trade barriers by national governments is the other. The 
effects of globalisation can be viewed as limiting what governments can do and ultimately 
transforming the state into a weaker actor in the face of multinational capital holders. Today 
national policy makers do not only need to accommodate business requirements but also need 
to concern themselves with relevant policies in other states in order to attract multinational 
capital holders. The competition among states has shifted from military equipment (arms 
races) to retaining or attracting capital investment within their territory. 22  The 
system-oriented approach is very appealing as a way of explaining the enormous power of 
multinational companies (MNCs). Furthermore, due to technological improvements, the 
nationality of capital has become much more complicated and difficult to determine. It is a 
topical discussion to address the nationality of capital in the globalised world. It has been 
argued that, in the globalised world, capital doesn’t have any specific nationality as the 
system-oriented scholars argue; however, national governments do limit capital owners in the 
following respects: fiscal regimes, labour and social security, environmental regulation, and 
finally the currency exchange rate.23 This argument might well explain the Want Want case, 
and to a larger extent, most Taishang cases. Want Want’s owner, Mr. Tsai, is of Taiwanese 
nationality, but his business career developed greatly in China. The Want Want company as a 
                                                        
19 David M. Andrews, “Capital Mobility and State Autonomy: Toward a Structural Theory of International 
Monetary Relations,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 2, 1994, pp. 193-218; Joseph A. Camilleri 
and James Falk, The End of Sovereignty?, Aldershot, Edward Elgar, 1992; Mathew Horsman and Andres 
Marshall, After the Nation State, London, HarperCollins, 1994. 
20 Dennis J. Encarnaion and Louis T. Wells Jr., “Sovereignty en Grade: Negotiating with Foreign Investors,” 
International Organization, Vol. 39, No. 1, 1985, p. 48; Philip G. Cerny (ed.), Finance and World Politics: 
Markets, Regimes and States in the Post-hegemonic Era, Aldershot, Edward Elgar, 1993. 
21 Vincent Cable, “The Diminished Nation-State: A Study in the Loss of Economic Power,” Daedalus, Vol. 124, 
No. 2, 1995, pp. 25-26. 
22 Ibid, pp. 23-53. 
23 Lorraine Eden, “Taxes, Transfer Pricing, and the Multinational Enterprise,” in Alan M. Rugman and Thomas 
L. Brewer (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Business, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 
591-619. 
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corporation can be a global brand (or at least a cross-Strait brand), but how do we define Mr. 
Tsai’s nationality? According to the above argument, the capital owner does have de jure 
nationality due to the realistic constrains of investment,24 so Mr. Tsai should not be classified 
as Taiwanese but rather as a Chinese capital owner. 
 
State-centred approach 
Stephen Krasner asserts that the state should be viewed as a main actor rather than a 
reflection of societal characteristics or an arena for social groups to compete.25 Krasner 
recognised that the interaction between the state and social interest groups is dynamic. That is 
to say, the state may be strong in some areas but weak in others; the pattern will probably not 
be exactly the same in respect to all policy areas. That is, policy decisions are often made in 
arenas that respond to narrow social and economic special interest groups, for instance in 
relation to agricultural and domestic economic policies.26 In brief, the state-centred approach 
holds that the state has the capacity or autonomy to select its own goals, and to interact with 
social groups as the means to achieving these selected goals. 
In combination with the state-centred approach, we emphasise that in the case of China, 
the government/business relationship also reflects the fact that China is a unique country with 
distinct characteristics of state capitalism.27 The CCP has steered the path of gradual, albeit 
uneven, integration within global capitalism, not through coercion but through different 
layers of close guanxi (relationship) with business groups. The core reason that China is 
characterised as a state capitalist economy is because the state’s capacity to exert control over 
the market is omnipresent, and therefore business groups have to fulfil the state’s goals or 
even more, to extend the state’s goal. This can be seen very clearly in the case of Want Want. 
In the Analysis section of this paper, we will particularly analyse two main issues, bearing the 
                                                        
24 Morgan-Mila Marc, “Capital, Nationality and State Sovereignty: New Links for the 21st Century,” conference 
paper at Capital Accumulation, Production and Employment: Can We Bend the Arc of Global Capital Toward 
Justice? World Economics Association, July 2016, 
http://capital2016.weaconferences.net/papers/capital-nationality-and-state-sovereignty-new-links-for-the-21st-ce
ntury/ (accessed on 10 May 2016) 
25 Stephen D. Krasner, “Approaches to the State: Alternatives Conceptions and Historical Dynamics,” 
Comparative Politics, Vol. 16, No. 2, 1984, pp. 224-225. 
26 Stephen D. Krasner, Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investment and U.S. Foreign Policy, 
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1978, p. 58. 
27 Jami Peck and Jun Zhang, “A Variety of Capitalism … with Chinese Characteristics?”, Journal of Economic 
Geography, Vol. 13, 2013, p. 373. 
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framework of state-centred analysis in mind: the rationale for Want Want’s investment in 
Taiwanese media, and the popular resistance to Want Want’s involvement.  
However, before going into a detailed analysis of Want Want’s motivations for buying 
into Taiwan’s media, we also want to explain why, among different kinds of investment, 
investment in media is an attractive choice to the capitalists. The media industry offers 
economic and socio-political benefits for media owners. The mass media market has been a 
major and expanding industry in the last century. In capitalist society, the media industry can 
generate surplus value, i.e., economic benefit. Furthermore, the media industry is also called 
the consciousness industry.28 Its products are full of social implications. In modern society, 
the media are the primary source of information, providing social images and defining social 
realities of the world. The media provide an arena where public opinions are expressed, 
discussed, and negotiated and where fame and celebrity status are conferred. The media are 
also where cultural values are constructed, stored, and expressed.29 
Because of its social and political importance, the media industry can be an important 
asset for its owners for the following two reasons. Firstly, the media may be used to protect 
the interests of the owners or the class that the owners belong to. Numerous studies have 
shown that mass media tend to produce messages that reflect the interests of capital or of a 
particular class, and protect the interests of the media owners themselves.30 
Secondly, the owners can use the media to build social ties with politicians who want to 
project favourable images through the media in order to influence public opinion; therefore, 
they would want to build relationships with the media owners. Thus, media owners can build 
ties with powerful agents and form power blocs. With these social ties, the media owner can 
evade laws and regulations.31 Thus, with the media as important social assets, media owners 
can protect and advance their interests. 
                                                        
28 Hans Magnus Enzensberger and Michael Roloff, The Consciousness Industry: On Literature, Politics and the 
Media, Seabury Press, 1974. 
29 Denis McQuail, McQuail's Mass Communication Theory, London, Sage, 2010. 
30 Vincent Mosco, The Political Economy of Communication: Rethinking and Renewal, London, Sage, 
1996; Ronald V. Bettig and Jeanne Lynn Hall, Big Media, Big Money: Cultural Texts and Political Economics, 
Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012. 
31 For example, in Great Britain, Rupert Murdoch used his media outlets to support Conservative candidate 
Margaret Thatcher. After acquiring two of Britain’s largest papers, Murdock attempted to buy the Sunday Times 
and The Times newspapers. This acquisition was forbidden by the UK`s Monopoly Commission, as Murdock 
already had two newspapers with circulations in the millions. However, with Thatcher’s support, Murdoch 
broke the rules and acquired the Times newspapers. Ben H. Bagdikian, The New Media Monopoly, Boston, 
Beacon Press, 2004, pp. 39-40. 
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In many countries, media ownership has become increasingly concentrated in the hands 
of the rich and powerful. Over several decades, media owners have sought to expand their 
businesses through horizontal and vertical integration, resulting in the formation of national 
media groups. However, their growth was largely restricted prior to the 1990s, when national 
governments regulated the media industry. With the rise of neoliberal ideology in the 1990s, 
most national governments adopted deregulation measures and lowered restrictions on 
ownership and foreign investment. Thus, as media ownership became more concentrated, 
media groups developed into “media behemoths.” Furthermore, companies outside the media 
industries (banks, investment companies, and other large corporate communication 
customers), recognising the importance of communication technology, also entered the media 
industry through mergers, shareholdings, and interlocking directorships.32 Scholars have 
criticised the recent deregulation and the resulting concentration of media ownership. They 
argue that such trends serve to reduce the diversity of information provided; consequently, the 
public will be poorly informed and will be restricted to a limited range of media options that 
protect and advance the media oligopoly's growing range of economic and political 
interests.33 In responding to those critical views, we do think Want Want could be a classic 
case to analyse how the country’s biggest conglomerate attempted to purchase the country`s 
major media outlets in order to expand its political and economic interests. 
 
The growth of Want Want’s investment: from Taiwan to China 
 
In order to explain Want Want’s emergence as a massive Taiwanese investor in China, we 
divide Want Want’s history of investment in China into four periods.  
 
First period: From 1987 to 1993 
Want Want started to invest in China in 1991: it belongs to the first generation of Taiwanese 
investment in China. Here, we argue that Taiwanese investment in China started in the early 
                                                        
32 Mosco, Political Economy of Communication, op. cit., p. 197.  
33 Robert W. McChesney, “Global Media, Neoliberalism, and Imperialism,” Monthly Review, March 2001, p. 
1. Academic OneFile, 
http://go.galegroup.com/ps/anonymous?id=GALE%7CA72704335&sid=googleScholar&v=2.1&it=r&linkacces
s=fulltext&issn=00270520&p=AONE&sw=w&authCount=1&isAnonymousEntry=true (accessed on 10 May 
2016). 
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1980s.34 However, before the government of Taiwan lifted martial law in 1987, business 
people were completely prohibited from investing in China. After lifting martial law, the 
Taiwanese government gradually relaxed the controls on investment in China. 35  The 
financial contribution of Taiwanese investment was the main concern for both central and 
local Chinese governments in this first period, and this is reflected in the interaction between 
Taiwanese investors and local governments.  
Want Want was a medium-sized food company in Taiwan in the 1980s. The owner of the 
company, Mr. Tsai Eng-Meng, decided to invest in China when the country started on a path 
of market reform and invited foreign investment. Tsai visited China in 1991 and invested in 
Hunan the next year. He was attracted by the warm welcome from the local Chinese 
government. The flexibility of the Chinese government towards Taiwanese business is 
reflected in the following examples. First of all, in the early 1990s, in the Special Economic 
Zones (SEZs) in Guangdong, Taishangs enjoyed preferential benefits relative to other foreign 
investors. Those benefits included better locations for factories. As one Taiwanese 
businessman recalls: “When we came to this small place (one county in Dongguan) in the 
early 1990s, there was no decent road with asphalt, only fields of rice. The party secretary of 
Dongguan promised to build a broad boulevard for transportation. In half a year`s time the 
road was built, directly from our factory to the nearest port.”36 Another example is land rent, 
which most local Chinese governments can waive for ten years in the case of Taishangs, 
whereas foreign investors only have a six-year rent holiday. The situation is similar in terms 
of tax breaks: Taishangs can enjoy a tax break for six to ten years, whereas most foreign 
investors only enjoy two years tax-free, with tax deductions at half the usual rate for another 
three years.37 
This is similar to the situation of Tsai’s investment in China during that period, but Tsai 
did not choose the coastal area where most Taishangs gathered. He decided to invest in 
                                                        
34 Yi-Wing Sung, The Emergence of Greater China, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p. 63.  
35 Charles H. C. Kao and Chu-Chia Steve Lin, “The Changing Economic Matrix between Taiwan and China,” 
in Tian-Jy Chen and Joseph S. Lee (eds), The New Knowledge Economy of Taiwan, Aldershot, Edward Elgar, 
2004, p. 262.  
36 Interview data (interview period 2004-2005). The interviewee was a former chairman of the Dongguan 
branch of the Taiwanese Business Association. The interviewee’s factory manufactured toys. Interview date: 22 
December 2004.  
37 “To Attract Taiwanese Businessmen to China, the Mainland Gave Taiwanese Businessmen More Benefits 
Than Other Foreign Investors,” Economic Daily, 31 May 1990. 
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Hunan Province in central China, south of the Yangtze River, mainly because the incentives 
provided by the local government were even better than in the coastal cities. According to 
Tsai, Hunan officials were very eager to cater to foreign investors and promised to meet all 
the demands of Want Want. They promised to build special electrical and transportation 
networks, to provide particular tax reductions and particular incentives for high-tech 
industries. Furthermore, the officials also provided administrative conveniences. 38  In 
exchange, Tsai promised to invest US$10 million in Hunan and bring job opportunities to the 
region. Tsai recalled that the major officials of the party, the government, and the military at 
the provincial level showed up at the signing ceremony, as it was the biggest investment in 
Hunan up to then.39 Nevertheless, in this early period, we argue that both government (the 
local Hunan government) and business (Want Want) remained focused on purely economic 
interests. For the Hunan government, Want Want represented a huge amount of investment 
that would boost local economic development, so the government was very willing to provide 
practical support to meet the company’s demands. Even for the central Chinese government, 
although they designed the regulations that stipulated that Taiwanese investors were entitled 
to more benefits than other foreign investors,40 they were mainly focused on attracting 
Taiwanese capital rather than using Taiwanese investors to accomplish the political goal of 
reunification in this period. 
 
Second period: From 1994 to 2000 
Want Want had a good start in Hunan. It shipped machines and staff from abroad, and earned 
USD 20 million in the first year, more than the revenues earned in Taiwan, and $40 million in 
the second year. As a result of the social connections they had made with local leaders, Want 
Want was given more favours by the Hunan government; for example, building infrastructure 
(water, transportation, and communications) for Want Want and providing Want Want with 
tax reductions – favourable conditions that were originally designed for export–oriented 
high-technology industries, but were applied to Want Want.41  
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The reason that the central and local Chinese government kept offering Taiwanese 
investors special flexibility was largely due to the fact that, since the early 1990s, Taiwanese 
investors had been able to cultivate close relationships with Taiwanese legislators. With the 
help of financial donations by Taishangs to legislators during election campaigns and during 
legislative terms, legislative restrictions were eased by legislators under the influence of 
actors (Taishangs) notorious for favoring less strict conditions for investment in China. One 
obvious case is the authorisation of the "three small direct links" between China and the 
Taiwan-controlled Kinmen & Mazu islands. Businessmen started to lobby as soon as Chen’s 
presidency began in 2000, and legislation was swiftly passed early the following year. The 
same has happened with policy-making. Tse-Kang Leng shows how big Taiwanese business 
groups already influenced Taiwan’s public policy uner the presidency of Lee Teng-hui, with 
the example of the private airline compagny EVA:  
 
In early 1994, Chang (president of EVA airline) began to urge the government to lift the ban 
on direct transportation across the Straits. In June, the MOEA’s Investment Commission 
approved a US$6 million plan by the Evergreen Group to build a container depot in 
Shanghai.42 
 
Naturally mainland policy became the most popular interpellation topic in Taiwan’s 
Legislative Yuan in the early 1990s. For instance, one Taiwanese investor in Tianjin 
expressed the view, “The Tianjin government runs a ‘Chinese Investment Research Seminar’ 
monthly, and most students of this seminar are Taiwanese legislators.”43 Not only keen on 
attending these short-term courses organised by the Chinese government, Taiwanese 
legislators were also keen to study for a degree from a reputed Chinese university during this 
period of time.44 The Chinese government therefore perceived the possibility of influencing 
Taiwanese lawmakers by wooing Taiwanese investors. According to Tse-Kang Leng, 
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although these legislators do not have the actual power to promulgate new laws, they 
certainly have effective power to lobby the executive branches.45 Suffice it to say that the 
results of these lobbying efforts are unpredictable: it depends on the fluctuating cross-Strait 
relationship and the businessmen-legislators’ financial power.46 However, more and more 
Taiwanese investors in China can be seen as having close links with Taiwanese lawmakers, 
and this certainly attracted the central Chinese government’s attention. Winning over the 
hearts and minds of Taiwanese investors therefore became a practical strategy to increase the 
central Chinese government’s influence on Taipei’s mainland policy.  
Apart from Taishangs’ increasing political power in the Legislative Yuan in Taipei, 
Taiwanese investors gradually became important envoys across the Strait. Furthermore, the 
semi-official channels Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF) and Association for Relations 
Across Taiwan Strait (ARATS) ceased interaction after 1999. Then-President Lee Teng-hui’s 
“Two countries Argument” in July 1999 contended that Taiwan is a sovereign country and 
that its international identity should be equal to that of the PRC. This assertion completely 
negated the “One China Principle.”47 The major consequence of Lee’s assertion was the 
indefinite postponement of official talks across the Strait and of a visit to Taiwan by Wang 
Daohan’s (then chairman of ARATS). The possibility of creating a formal negotiation channel 
across the Strait accordingly came to an end after the two bodies ceased their contact. In light 
of the declining interaction between the SEF and ARATS after 1999, both governments 
placed more value on the existing, but informal, channel of Taishangs as their bridge across 
the Strait. The Deputy Chairman of ARATS, Tang Shubei, stated explicitly in 2000 that the 
Chinese central government relied more on Taishangs as their bridge to the government in 
Taipei since negotiations could not be conducted via official channels.48 
Secondly, the Taipei government could hardly ignore the voice of Taiwanese businesses. 
Taiwanese investors after 2000 increasingly influenced the Taipei government’s mainland 
policy, not only at the legislative level but also at the policy-making level. Taiwan is in the 
process of consolidating democracy; therefore, government leaders rely more on the support 
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of businesses both in running for election and in financing the government. In other words, 
the government–business relationship in Taiwan gradually transformed into government 
dependence on business people’s demands. As we argued in our theoretical framework from a 
society-oriented business/government relation’s perspective, governments have the pressure 
of facing a trade-off with capital owners to secure their political continuance.49 This is the 
reason that during this period, the influence of Taishangs on Taipei’s mainland policy was 
greater than in the previous period, from 1994 to 1999. Both the KMT and the DPP needed 
business support to run or sustain their presidency. The battles between the KMT and the DPP 
to win the support of Taishangs can be seen in the following example, whereby both party 
leaders promised a more open Mainland policy before the presidential election. After 
announcing his decision to stand as the KMT candidate for the 2008 presidential election, Ma 
Ying-jeou met with Taiwanese investors and promised to offer a more open Mainland Policy 
under the banner of protecting Taiwan’s economic security.50 On the same day, the DPP also 
held a tea party for Taiwanese investors and reported on the progress of Taipei’s Mainland 
policy from 2004 to the present.51  
Although there is no specific evidence to prove that Want Want built contacts with 
Taiwanese legislators during this period, the reason we detail Taishangs’ emerging political 
importance in this period is to demonstrate why the Chinese government would view 
Taiwanese businesses as agents to achieve their political goals. Want Want, as we emphasise, 
is the extreme case of Taishangs being an agent for the Chinese government to achieve such 
goals.  
 
Third period: From 2001 to 2008 
In connection with the previous period, from 2001 to 2008, the central government kept 
encouraging local governments to offer special flexibility towards Taiwanese investors.52 In 
order to enter the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001, the Chinese government should 
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apply equivalent regulations to all non-Chinese investors. China officially declared that all 
preferential tax regulations for foreign investors, including Taiwanese investors, would be 
decreased in stages from 2000.53 In order to become a permanent member of the WTO, 
China was obliged to offer all WTO members equal trading privileges. This commitment to 
the WTO means that China cannot grant special privileges to any specific investors, including 
Taiwanese investors. Nevertheless, as we mentioned in the previous period, with the rapidly 
increasing Taiwanese investment and Taishangs’ influence on Taiwan’s domestic politics, the 
central Chinese government became increasingly aware that close economic ties across the 
Strait gave the Chinese government more strength in the cross-Strait relationship. According 
to Shen Kunrong, director of the cross-Strait Economic Development Research Centre of 
China's Nanjing University, “Taiwanese investment provided a richer and more solid 
foundation for the implementation of Beijing’s policy on cross-Strait reunification than 
military strength. If cross-Strait economic relations keep growing, it will put pressure on the 
Taipei government to take a pro-Beijing position in their mainland policy.”54 Taiwanese 
investors consequently became more important in the sense of bearing the responsibility for 
reunification in the central government’s considerations.  
The importance of Taishangs can be illustrated by the case of Want Want. In 2002 Want 
Want gained permission to enter other businesses, including insurance, hospitals, and 
restaurants, and as a result, Want Want became a conglomerate at the provincial level. Based 
on the Hunan model, Want Want built factories in different regions on the mainland beyond 
Hunan, as Tsai considered in 1994 that “the Chinese market is so vast and boundless.”55 
While other provincial governments were eager to attract foreign investment, Want Want 
chose those provinces that provided favourable conditions, such as cheap land and buildings. 
In the following 13 years, Want Want established more than 100 factories and distribution 
networks in different regions of China.56 By making the most of the vast market, Want Want 
made big profits. 
In line with the greater importance of Taiwanese businesses in China for both the central 
and local Chinese governments, by 2004 Want Want was deeply rooted in China, from 
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production to consumption. First, Want Want built factories and branches in most provinces 
of the mainland. Second, Want Want adopted machines made in China, used its raw materials 
(e.g., rice), and employed Chinese workers in order to cut the cost of production and compete 
with emerging competitors.57 Third, most of Want Want’s market was in China, and most of 
its revenues were generated from China.58 Fourthly, Want Want developed new products for 
different sectors and regions of the Chinese market. 59  Lastly, Want Want moved its 
headquarters to Shanghai: the Yilan company in Taiwan was now merely a branch of the 
China Want Want group.  
 
Fourth period: From 2008 to 2016 
In this period, dramatic change occurred not only in the cross-Strait relationship but also 
in the global economic structure. There are several issues worth discussing in this context, of 
which the most crucial include competition with emerging local enterprises, dealing with 
labour issues, facing global economic recession, and finally, the KMT’s return to power in 
Taiwan. These changes directly affected Taishangs’ interaction with local officials. Most of 
them state that their position of “privilege” significantly declined during this period. 
Although Taiwanese investment is still important for local governments, Taiwanese 
businesses no longer seem to have such easy access to local officials.60 According to one 
Taiwanese investors in Kunshan:  
 
In the past, we could call the mayor directly on his mobile, even at midnight. Now if we 
wanted to see the mayor we needed to wait for his secretary to arrange an appointment. 
Sometimes we had to wait for weeks.61 
 
In the first period discussed above, many Taiwanese businesses enjoyed benefits from 
local governments, for instance tax rebates and low-cost land rental. However, after 15 years, 
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most tax privileges were suspended. Therefore, from 2008 onwards, most Taiwanese 
businesses had already enjoyed this tax break. As for the land rental, at the beginning, in 
order to attract as much Taiwanese investment as possible, most local officials agreed to offer 
Taiwanese businesses extremely cheap rents. Nevertheless, their promises were unreliable, 
since there were no written documents or formal policies. Under these circumstances, 
Taiwanese businesses have had to compete not only with other foreign investors but also with 
domestic investors on an equal basis. Most Taishangs remark that in competition with other 
foreign investors, they might gain some trifling benefits because of their shared language and 
culture, but in competition with domestic enterprises, Taiwanese businesses don’t enjoy any 
advantages.62 
After the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Employment Contracts (hereafter 
referred to as the new labour law) came into effect on 1 January 2008, many employers in 
China started to panic about their human resource expenditure, because this new labour law 
provided detailed protection for labour.63 For Taiwanese businesses, this was the worst 
possible timing. In 2008, the implementation of the new labour law meant that most 
Taiwanese SMEs that were benefiting from cheap labour now faced a rather challenging 
situation. 
The KMT came back into power: for most Taiwanese businessmen in China, this was 
not necessarily a good thing. As Lee points out, the strategic value of Taishangs during the 
DPP era was far more important than in the KMT era, because Taishangs served as political 
agents across the Strait under Chen Shui-bian’s government, but not under Ma Ying-jeou.64 
All these changes applied to the particular case of the Want Want group’s investment 
in China. Rightly, given all the harsh circumstances faced by Taiwanese investors after 2009, 
Want Want developed new practices. It began to purchase media, first in Hong Kong and then 
in Taiwan. This investment in the media business was different from the previous investment 
that Want Want had been involved in. First, in the past, Want Want had not invested in the 
risky media businesses; especially in 2008, the profitability and prospects of the media 
business were uncertain, if not gloomy. Second, Want Want had stayed in the mainland 
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because of the low cost of production, but costs in the media business were high. Third, in the 
past, Tsai had not openly talked about politics, but now he did talk about politics, claiming 
that he had invested in Taiwan’s media industry in order to strengthen the cross-Strait 
relationship. According to Tsai, when the pro-China KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou won the 
presidency in 2008 and ended the pro-independence DPP’s rule, Tsai anticipated that 
cooperation between the two sides of the Strait would be enhanced. He agreed with Ma’s 
mainland policy and decided to come back to Taiwan and to enhance the understanding of 
Taiwanese people about mainland China.65 After buying the Want Want media group, Tsai 
has continued to hold cross-strait semi-official forums, inviting high-ranking officials and 
leading business figures from Chinese provinces and Taiwan. For example, Tsai established a 
new title – Want Daily. This paper, together with the Shanghai City government, has held 
annual forums66 to establish links between the business hubs of China and cities in Taiwan. 
In the forums, Taiwanese mayors were invited, the Shanghai mayor expressed his 
anticipation of cross-Strait communication, and the publisher Tsai, admiring the rise of China 
as an economic superpower, testified that he had witnessed the success of China’s economic 
reform.67 
 
Analysis 
 
Want Want’s rationale for investing in Taiwanese media: Buying the media as a social asset 
for building political ties  
Arguably, Want Want invested in the media business mainly to build ties with CCP officials 
in the central government and to extend its business in China. As we argued in our theoretical 
section, China’s economic system is state capitalist; that is, the party-state controls the flow 
of capital but also allocates resources to the private sector.68 In 2006, Want Want was 
expanding as an international conglomerate and would need the support of the CCP. For 
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example, in 2006 Want Want was listed on the Hong Kong stock market; part of its stocks 
were bought by the state banks of China and pro-CCP conglomerates, including Hong 
Kong’s richest businessman, Li Ka-shing.   
  Want Want entered the media business when the CCP launched its “Grand Overseas 
Propaganda” Campaign. After the 2008 Olympic torch protest, the CCP actively co-opted 
Chinese capitalists to acquire media corporations in Europe and the United States.69 In this 
context, Want Want bought half the shares in Asia TV in Hong Kong in 2009. Want Want 
purchased the China Times Media Group (which consists of China Times and Commercial 
Times, and many magazine titles, a terrestrial TV station, China Television Co., and a cable 
news channel, CTiTV) just before the anti-Communist Apple Daily made an offer to buy the 
China Times Group.  
Arguably, Want Want acquired the China Times group to accumulate social and 
economic capital in order to expand its business in China. The Want Want group owner 
voluntarily provided ideological services for the CCP. Tsai openly displayed his support for 
Beijing. He told the Washington Post in an interview that the crackdown on 4 June was “no 
massacre.”70 The media under the Want Want group further carried out “product placement” 
projects for Beijing; that is, the Want Want group received fees from the Chinese government 
and allocated the fees to other Taiwanese media to publicise stories favourable to China.71 
Providing ideological services for Beijing, the Want Want media group waged wars 
against Taiwanese citizen groups, thus violating the social and economic principles of the 
media. Because the China Times Media Group consisted of different media outlets, media 
reform groups and some media academics were concerned about Want Want’s control of 
Taiwan’s media; they demanded that regulators should not approve the acquisition easily.72 
The Want Want group did not make any promises to Taiwanese society, for example on 
protecting press freedom and respecting professionalism. Instead, it filed lawsuits against 
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citizen groups, reporters, and college professors it deemed hostile. Want Want’s attack on its 
opponents triggered more resistance, as 149 scholars signed a petition to demand that Want 
Want stop the lawsuits and respect media professionalism.73 
While losing social support in Taiwan, Want Want’s owner strengthened his ties with 
high-ranking officials and gained social status in China. First, according to an article in 
Common Wealth, Want Want’s owner gave a briefing to the head of China’s Taiwan Affairs 
Office about buying Taiwan’s media. The Chinese official promised to assist Want Want in 
doing business in China.74  
Second, Want Want could mobilise its own media to provide positive images to Chinese 
officials. The media in the China Times group often offered positive images of China and 
different provinces of China. When officials visited Taiwan and met important people in 
Taiwan, they would visit Tsai at the China Times group, hoping that he would offer positive 
images to them.  
Third, Want Want’s owners became an important channel (or agents) between the 
powerful elites of the two countries. The China Times group, together with various Chinese 
local governments, hosted cross-Strait forums to discuss economic cooperation between 
Taiwan and China. In these forums, high-ranking Chinese officials would be presented; Want 
Want chose which Taiwanese politicians and business figures to invite to these important 
occasions.75 
Fourth, in 2011, the Want Want group and other state enterprises received support from 
the Chinese government. According to a study by Fathom China, in 2013, out of 50 
prominent private-sector Chinese firms, 45 received subsidies; Want Want was sixth on the 
list, receiving US$11 million from the Chinese government, which was about 11% of its net 
profit.76 
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Finally, the owner of Want Want gained social influence in China. In 2012, Tsai was 
nominated one of China’s most prominent figures in the economic field by China Central 
Television (CCTV). Only twenty Chinese were nominated; Want Want group owner Tsai was 
on that VIP list.77 
These five factors identified the case of Want Want as one of mastering media as a 
strategic asset to gain rewards from the Chinese government in the form of facilitating its 
business in China. In the framework of the state-centred approach, Want Want fully complied 
with the Chinese government’s demands. Furthermore, Want Want does not just want to be 
granted economic benefits for its business in China. As our evidence indicates, it also seeks to 
be an influential Taiwanese business across the Strait, a strategically important goal for Want 
Want because the model of state capitalism in China can open more possibilities for Want 
Want’s expansion in China. For the Chinese government, Want Want became an eager agent. 
Through the Want Want media platforms, the Chinese government met not only Taiwanese 
businessmen but also Taiwanese officials. It was a “win-win” situation for both the Chinese 
government and the Want Want group. The cost of this victory, resistance from Taiwanese 
society, is what we will discuss in the next section.  
 
The cost of Want Want’s strategy: Local resistance 
To gain more influence in Taiwan’s media industry, in autumn 2011, Want Want proposed to 
buy Taiwan’s second largest MSO. MSOs were very important in Taiwan’s media landscape. 
First, cable television was dominant in Taiwan, as 70% of households subscribed to cable 
television. Second, cable operators could decide which channels were shown and their 
positions on the platform. Third, cable systems were concentrated in four major MSOs; 
among them, China Network System Co. controlled 20% of cable subscribers. Thus, Want 
Want attempted to buy this MSO from a foreign investment company, MBK Partners Ltd., at 
a cost of US$ 2.4 billion, the highest media merger fee in Asia.78 The Want Want group 
claimed that the merger would boost Taiwan’s media industry and recover it from foreign 
hands. 
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However, because Want Want had utilised the media to please Chinese officials and to 
attack its opponents, some academics opposed the merger. There were three arguments 
against it. First, it would bring about a media monopoly and affect pluralism. The opponents 
argued that Want Want already owned the China Times Group, including several media 
outlets – two newspapers, several magazine titles, TV channels, and a radio station; with the 
MSO, Want Want would interfere with other media outlets with its power to decide which 
channels could be broadcast via cable. Second, the applicant, Want Want, was not “fit and 
proper” as a television licence holder. The opponents reviewed the performance of the Want 
Want China Times Group over the past year and listed several actions taken by the group that 
they said were either illegal or unprofessional. In particular, Want Want had conducted 
product placement operations for the CCP; this practice was illegal.79 Third, there was the 
“China factor.” Some scholars coined the term “China factor” to describe the way the rich 
and powerful in the cross-Strait relationship began to make alliances and to influence 
Taiwan’s democracy and press freedom.80 
It can be argued that this opposition was triggered by the Want Want group, as Want 
Want did not follow the usual principles of Taiwanese society. The reason we argue that the 
Want Want group is right not to take too much notice of Taiwanese society is because the 
Taiwanese government is not the one that Want Want as a business group will gain profit or 
benefit from. As we discussed under government/business relationships, we assert that the 
state-centred approach is more relevant to explaining our example. Here we would like to 
emphasise that the business group submits to the government’s demands because of 
economic benefits that the business needed from that very government. Therefore, for the 
Want Want group, the Chinese government was the one that would grant them such benefits, 
not the Taiwanese government. This is the reason why the Want Want group presented the 
Chinese government with such a strategic asset: media influence over Taiwanese society. In 
an earlier merger, the Fubon telecommunications group had proposed to acquire the biggest 
MSO; on this occasion only a few media scholars had pointed out the danger of media 
monopoly. However, in the Want Want case, as Want Want did not care about the social and 
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economic principles of Taiwanese society, but used its media to support the Chinese 
government and to attack its opponents at home, scholars from different disciplines 
(economics, law, sociology, telecommunications, and so on) mobilised against the merger. 
For example, scholars co-signed a statement entitled “Watch out, a media monster is 
threatening” in protest against the merger, demanding that the National Communications 
Commission (NCC) should set up a special committee to review the case carefully.81 Later, 
more than 3,000 citizens signed.82 Further, some prominent intellectuals launched a boycott 
against Want Want media by giving up writing columns for the China Times. At this stage, 
the intellectual community was mobilised against Want Want’s merger. 
Want Want continued to test the limits of Taiwanese society when regulators (the NCC) 
ruled on the merger. Based on a previous case, on 25 July 2012, the NCC ruled that there 
must be separation between the MSO and the news channel.83 Both Want Want and its 
opponents were upset about the ruling. Want Want expected to pass unconditionally and to be 
allowed to control both the MSO and the news channel. The opposition demanded that the 
NCC reject the proposal. On the day of the ruling, several college professors submitted a 
petition to the NCC, urging the media regulator to reject the deal. About 200 students later 
appeared to protest against the merger. Two publications under the Want Want China Times 
Group showed pictures of the students allegedly receiving cash from an anonymous 
woman.84 The stories then implied that one of the professors, Dr. Huang, had mobilised the 
students for the protest. Huang said he did not know that a group of students would show up 
after he left the premises.85 When one National Tsinghua University student, Chen Wei-ting, 
questioned Want Want’s motives, he also became a target of criticism by media outlets under 
the group.  
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Because Want Want had fabricated stories to attack its opponents, young people began 
to realise that the media owner could openly use its media outlets as tools to attack his 
enemies. On 31 July 2012, hundreds of students, organised by “Youth Alliance Against the 
Media Monster,” gathered in front of the television station of the China Times group, 
protesting against the Want Want Group and accusing it of violating professional journalistic 
values and damaging Taiwan’s democracy and freedom. They demanded that the Want Want 
group abandon the merger.86  
This movement reached a peak on 1 September 2012, as tens of thousands of journalists, 
students, academics, and social activists took to the streets of Taipei to protest against media 
monopolisation. Their main demands included protecting media professionalism, an apology 
from the Want Want China Times Group, supervision by the NCC, and ending media 
monopolies.87 The participants made the following main points: first, they pointed out that 
untrammelled media moguls would threaten freedom of speech in Taiwan. Second, they 
demanded that the NCC take legal measures to protect media professionalism. Third, they 
observed that the so-called “China factor” was not only an academic term but effective in real 
life, influencing Taiwan’s democracy, and they demanded that “the Chinese should get their 
dirty hands off media and journalism in Taiwan.”88 
However, Want Want did not accept the demands of the civil society groups and 
demonstrators; because Want Want’s main interests have been on the Chinese mainland, Want 
Want wanted to build ties with Chinese officials, not with Taiwanese civil society groups. The 
demonstrators demanded that the Want Want group stop buying Taiwanese media, but Tsai 
Eng-Meng said he would continue to buy more and even bigger Taiwanese media,89 and 
Want Want later made an offer to buy its competing newspaper, Apple Daily. Moreover, the 
demonstrators demanded that the Want Want media group should foster journalistic 
                                                        
86 “Want Want monster has violated journalism professionalism and ethics, and damaged Taiwan’s democracy 
and freedom,” http://idontwantwantleague.blogspot.tw/2012/12/blog-post_740.html (accessed on 10 October 
2016). 
87 Loa Lok-sin, “Thousands Protest Media Monopoly,” Taipei Times, 2 September 2012, 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2012/09/02/2003541753 (accessed on 10 May 2016). 
88 Shelley Shan, “Want Want Deal Still in Balance,” Taipei Times, 28 July 2012, 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2012/07/28/2003538815 (accessed on 10 May 2016). 
89 Apple Daily, “Tsai Eng-Meng Says: Not Interfering in Apple Daily,” 28 November, 2012, 
http://www.appledaily.com.tw/appledaily/article/headline/20120508/34212781/ (accessed on 1 June 2016). 
 27 
professionalism by establishing democratic decision-making mechanisms in the newsroom, 
but the Want Want group totally ignored this demand. 
The Want Want group was clearly either unwilling or unable to enter into real dialogue 
with Taiwanese civil society groups.  
 
Conclusions and discussion 
 
Since 2008, a new type of media investor has emerged in Taiwan. The Taiwanese 
businessman, Want Want’s owner, who made a fortune in China, returned to Taiwan after 
2008 and tried to influence Taiwan’s media and politics. The Want Want group is different 
from previous Taishangs, who mainly focused on their own businesses, seldom returned to 
Taiwan, and remained apolitical. Want Want not only returned to Taiwan, but also tried to use 
the media as a mouthpiece of the Chinese government, even at the cost of losing the 
Taiwanese market and the confidence of the Taiwanese people. This paper set out to analyse 
the rise and the rationale of this new type of media investor. 
We have tried to answer this question in the light of the business/government 
relationship, regarding the Chinese state as a major player in this context. We mainly adopted 
the state-centred approach and argued that China has distinct characteristics of state 
capitalism; that is, the CCP’s path toward capitalism has been paved with different layers of 
relationships closely linked with business groups. We have also explained how capitalists 
could use the media as an important social asset to build ties with politicians who want to 
gain publicity, favourable images, and influence. These social ties can create economic 
benefits, particularly under Chinese state capitalism. 
We have also analysed the development of Want Want in the context of Taiwanese 
investment in China. As we have shown, right after the Tiananmen Square Event of 4 June 
1989, some foreign investors left China, and Chinese local governments were beckoning 
Taiwanese businessmen with many incentives to attract them. In the early 1990s, Want Want 
grasped this opportunity, building factories and retail outlets across many provinces, and 
developing various types of content for different sectors of the Chinese market. Yet, as the 
private sector has developed in China since 2000, the Chinese government has had to pay 
more attention to Chinese businesspeople. In addition to this, following China`s entry into the 
WTO, offering special incentives to Taiwanese businesses has become more complicated due 
 28 
to WTO regulations. Thus, Taishangs have had to build ties with party and government 
officials. In this context, to seek further expansion in China, Want Want has had to build 
social ties with Chinese officials. 
As we have shown, to achieve this, Want Want invested in Taiwanese media as a social 
asset in order to build political ties on the Chinese mainland. In most cases, media tycoons 
use the media of a country to build social ties with politicians of that country. What is 
extraordinary in this case is that, in the special context of cross-Strait relations whereby the 
PRC has attempted to control the ROC (Taiwan), Want Want bought media concerns in 
Taiwan as an important social asset in order to build social ties in China and to expand its 
business in the Chinese mainland, even at the cost of losing markets, trust, and confidence in 
Taiwan. As we have seen, in doing so, Want Want also triggered resistance from Taiwanese 
civil society, which ultimately resulted in the failure of the merger case. 
We have to reconsider the nature of this new sort of media investment, particularly as, 
following in Want Want’s footsteps, other big Taiwanese businesses in China have also 
attempted to buy Taiwanese media companies. For example, Ting Hsin International Group 
made an offer on the same MSO (China Network System Co.). Also, HTC, a mobile phone 
manufacturer based in China, purchased all the shares of a major channel group, TVBS 
(which consists of TVBS Entertainment Channel, TVBS News, and TVBS Asia). Because of 
the political economy of the region, this type of media investment will continue to exist, 
using the media as assets to build social ties and to multiply economic benefit. Thus, we need 
to consider the nature of the investment: is it considered Taiwanese capital or Red capital, or 
a special type that is based in country A, although the owner’s nationality is of country B? 
This is not merely a conceptual issue, but also a regulatory issue. 
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